Analysis of Urban Public Transit Pricing Adjustment Program Evaluation Based on Trilateral Game  by Gong, Huawei & Jin, Wenzhou
 Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences  138 ( 2014 )  332 – 339 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
1877-0428 © 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
Peer-review under responsibility of Beijing Jiaotong University(BJU), Systems Engineering Society of China (SESC).
doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.07.211 
ScienceDirect
The 9th International Conference on Traffic & Transportation Studies (ICTTS’2014) 
Analysis of Urban Public Transit Pricing Adjustment Program 
Evaluation Based on Trilateral Game 
Huawei Gonga,b, Wenzhou Jina,* 
a  School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South China University of Technology, No.381 Wushan Road, Tianhe District, Guangzhou 
510641, P.R. China 
b  School of Civil Engineering, Guangzhou University, Panyu University City Outer Ring Road No.230, Guangzhou 510006, P.R. China  
 
Abstract 
Establishment and implementation of the urban transportation pricing adjustment program will have great impacts on holistic 
development of urban transportation. The paper establishes a trilateral game model on pricing adjustment program participants, 
including governments, public transport enterprise and passengers. Through analyzing trilateral benefits, the model can conclude 
if an adjustment program succeeds or not. Furthermore, adopting the modeling method of Stackelberg oligopoly model, applying 
backward induction method in model analysis, the model presents an evaluation method for estimating whether the public transit 
pricing adjustment program is successful or not. The work provides a research method for studying the feasibility of an urban 
transportation pricing adjustment program. 
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1. Introduction  
In large or middle-scale cities of China, traffic congestion becomes increasingly serious. To develop the public 
transport and inhibit the private transport, as well as to advocate the concept of public transport priority, can be 
deemed as necessary measures for improving traffic conditions. There are many ways to develop public transport, 
especially, reducing the cost of bus travel, which is becoming one of the most important way. For example, since 
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2007, in Beijing, the municipal government reduced an ordinary bus ticket price to 0.4 yuan per trip, subway ticket 
price reduced to 2 yuan per trip. With other bus priority measures, in 2009, the proportion of public transport in 
Beijing increased by 10.7%, thus reached 38.9%, comparing with which in 2003.  Furthermore, in 2010, in 
Guangzhou, a public transit pricing adjustment was executed, which was, in a natural month, when a passenger took 
bus or subway using the same Yang Cheng Tong card more than 15 times accumulatively (Metro and bus ride could 
be accumulated equivalently), from the 16th bus or subway ride, he could get a 40% discount each ride for the rest 
of that month. 
Involving the interests of many aspects, urban public transit pricing adjustment program is a complex task. The 
quality of adjustment program will have direct impact on the effect of the implementation. In fact, whether increase 
the taxi fare or reduce bus fare will always cause widespread social debate. So the feasibility of the adjustment 
program should be studied carefully. 
For public transport pricing program development and adjustment, the most commonly method is technical 
economics analysis, with emphasis on profit. Although this method satisfy the economic rules, frequently a higher 
pricing program will be formulated and the affordability of the residents often be ignored. When the public does not 
accept this pricing program, the proportion of public transport use will decline, the city's overall traffic conditions 
will get worse. On the contrary, some cities, such as Beijing enacted a significant reduction in the cost of public 
transport schemes, although it greatly improved the proportion of public transport use, but government must invest a 
lot of financial subsidies, and it is not realistic for most cities. In the previous studies of public transport pricing 
scheme, using Game Theory model for analysis is not uncommon. The researchers established the game model of 
public transport and private transport, or public transport user and public transport manager game theory model to 
determine a reasonable ticket price of the program. The relationship between public transit demand and total travel 
demand has been studied (Bian and Lu, 2009) according to the ticket prices. Logit model is used to establish the 
mode split in public transit system. Then the profit functions of both firms are presented. Based on the profit 
functions, a price game model is provided to discuss the competition between urban railway and bus. The existence 
and computing method of the Nash equilibrium price solutions are proposed. The conclusions of this research are 
useful to managers for their operations with urban public transit system, but this study didn't pay attention to the 
benefit participant role in ticket pricing. The constitutions and characteristics of urban public transit system was 
introduced (Wang, 2008), then expatiated some principles about the price of public transit. On the basis of 
summarization of the pricing and subsidy principles, the game theory has been established in ticket pricing and 
subsidy of urban public transit. Although the study had analyzed the relationship between the three participants, and 
based on cooperation and non-cooperation game model, public transportation enterprise pricing model are 
established respectively, but she didn’t establish trilateral model to analyze the problem. Game theory model were 
established in analyzing the traffic model choice or ticket pricing (Chen and Luo, 2005; Chen et al., 2010; Wang and 
Chen, 2008). A tri-level programming is presented in order to seek the optimal passenger transport price while the 
benefits of passengers and transport departments are both considered under the condition of market competition 
between different transport modes (Si and Gao, 2007). In our work, we establish a game theory model of the main 
pricing program participants as players-- the government, public transport enterprise and passengers. Through 
benefit analysis we get the game equilibrium conditions, that is the basis for us to judge program success or not.  
2.  The Tripartite Benefit Analysis of Public Transit Pricing Adjustment Program 
The public transit pricing adjustment program mostly formulated by government in China. According to China's 
metropolitan public transport services and pricing policy, we believe that the main participants include three 
categories of government, public transport enterprise and passengers, analyzing the benefit relations of tripartite 
participants as follows: 
Firstly, the role of government. The primary purpose of government is to achieve the maximization of social 
welfare in public transit pricing adjustment. As public transport manager, the government want to provide good 
conditions to meet the travel demand of the passengers,  keep the cost of public transit in a reasonable level, and 
provide financial subsidies to public transport enterprises. On the one hand the government need to lower fares to 
make more proportionate use of public transit, on the other hand government should provide public transport 
enterprises for a certain degree of financial subsidies, so that the bus enterprises can get a better economic benefits. 
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While financial subsidies should be supported by the public, and financial subsidies level of the city should be 
within the acceptable range; 
Secondly, the role of public transport enterprise. The enterprises provide transport services to meet the 
passengers' travel demand, it want to achieve maximize profits through the ticket pricing and operation management. 
The bus enterprises accept lower fares formulated by the government  and provide a certain extent service level (For 
example passenger load factor and departure time interval) to meet the travel demand of the people , on the other 
hand the enterprises  improve economic performance through government financial subsidies.  
Thirdly, the role of passenger. Passengers get transportation services by the public transport enterprises. The 
travel cost (such as time or price ) should be minimized , where the fare levels are acceptable to the majority of total 
public , otherwise it will reduce the proportion of the public traffic using, urban traffic conditions should be 
deteriorated further. At the same time, the public will question whether it is reasonable that government subsidies 
for public transport enterprise, and whether public transport service can be satisfactory. 
Based on the above analysis, we can describe the relationship between the three roles as follows: the government 
use financial funds to subsidize public transport enterprises, and government try to lower fares and improve public 
transport usage ratio, reduce urban traffic congestion , but the high subsidies will become the city 's financial 
burden , and it will result in some public opposition ; bus companies require higher financial subsidies if they accept 
fare reduction scheme, otherwise companies will resist pricing adjustment programs , or reduced traffic service 
levels ; passengers hope for a low level bus fares and better public transit service levels while they want a  
reasonable and effective financial subsidies , otherwise they will use other modes of transportation, reduce the usage 
proportion of public transport modes, increasing urban traffic burden. Considering the effects of this mutual 
relationship, it is very suitable for using the game theory model. In the process of establishing the fare adjustment 
program, we can formulate a rational program measures to coordinate the interests of three participants. 
 
3.  Trilateral Game Model of Pricing Adjustment Program Evaluation 
3.1. Model Elements Analysis 
The model assumes that the public transport pricing adjustment program has tripartite parties in the game, it is 
called players in game theory which include the government, public transport enterprises and passengers. 
Government formulates the pricing adjustment program. The intensity of financial subsidies for public transport 
enterprises is denoted by the variable GI . At the same time, the variable P  denotes the penalty factor, which 
measures the government will punish enterprises in some ways when the pricing adjustment programs fail.  It 
reflects the government and public transport enterprises relationship in China. Public transport enterprises are led 
and guided on price by government.  Public transport enterprises decide the extent to implementation of the pricing 
adjustment programs by the government financial subsidies GI  and penalty factor P .  The variable EI denotes the 
efforts (or payment) level when enterprises accept the pricing adjustment programs, this variable reflect on the 
efforts level when enterprises accept the pricing adjustment programs. Passengers determine their level of 
acceptance that the future implementation of the pricing adjustment program according to government price 
adjustment programs and fare levels (assume that the fare level is much lower, the higher degree of public 
acceptance). We denote variables e  to represent the acceptance level; because the use of public transport passengers 
will pay any kind of price for it, the function )(eC  is defined to measure this kind of price. The model assumes that 
the function )(eC  is only related with acceptance level variable e . Assuming the public transport function )(eC  is 
increasing function about variable e , ie 0)( !c eC . And the function )(eC  satisfies the marginal cost of incremental 
in nature. ( )(eC  is a concave function ), ie 0)( !cc eC . 
The model assumes this game is only one stage of the process, and ultimately the fare adjustment programs only 
in a "success" or "failure" of two states. The model assume that the probability of success for the pricing adjustment 
programs is )()()( eII EG JED , where )( GID , )( EIE , )(eJ  depend on the variables GI , EI , e  respectively. In fact, 
the success of public transport pricing adjustment programs is defined as the success of all players in game, that 
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means only one of players fail in the game, the program is considered to have failed. So we can 
get 0)( !GID , 0)( !EIE , 0)( !eJ when the program is success. Assuming )( GID  has the following properties: 
(1) 1)(0 dd GID , ie the probability belongs to [0,1] ; 
(2) 0)( !c GID , it means the probability of success to public transit adjustment program will rise with the 
intensity of financial subsidies is increased by the government. The public transport enterprises will provide more 
support in program if the financial subsidies increase, which means lower price and better services; 
 (3) 0)( cc GID , it means the probability of success exhibit diminishing marginal nature if the government 
provides more financial subsidies, because of too much subsidies will lead deterioration of the financial burden, and 
it will cause part of public opposition. 
If the pricing adjustment program implemented successfully, the players utilities were recorded as G , E , P , 
otherwise the players utilities were recorded as 0 . For the model, we are only care of the probability of positive 
returns, without regard to the size of its value, so that the problem is more convenient and effective treatment. 
In the course of the game, we assume that in the game the players have a common knowledge, that the whole 
game rules and procedures, they have the same awareness as well as different decision utilities under their respective 
values. 
3.2.  The Expected Utility Analysis of Game Players 
The government's expected benefit with variable GE , the calculation process is as follows: 
 
        Table 1. Calculate the government
s success probability of game result and utilities 
Game result success Failure 
Probability )()()( eII EG JED   )()()(1 eII EG JED   
Utility PIGG   EIP  
 
Calculate  )()]()()(1[)()()()( EEGGGEGG IPeIIPIeIIE  JEDJED  
.)()()()( EGEG IPPeII  JED  
Similarly, we can calculate expected utilities of public transport enterprises and passengers. 
 
EEEGE IPPeIIE  )()()()( JED  
)()()()( eCeIIE PEGP  JED . 
 
    In the model, 0tGE , 0tEE ˈ 0tpE . Because the players of the game  hope to get positive utilities (the 
government hopes to obtain good social benefits, improve the public transport usage ratio; enterprises want to get 
better economic benefit; passengers want to lower ticket prices and improve the public transport service level), 
otherwise they will quit the game, means that the failure of the program. The expected utility of game players are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The summary of game players expected utilities 
Game players variables Expected utilities 
Government GI ǃ P  EGEG IPPeII  )()()()( JED  
Public transport enterprises EI  EEEG IPPeII  )()()()( JED  
Passengers e  )()()()( eCeII PEG JED  
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4.  The Analysis of the Game Equilibrium 
4.1. Solute The Game Model by Backward Induction Method 
      According to the Chinese national conditions, the government in pricing adjustment program is a dominant 
participants, in many cases, the government may give the bus company administrative instruction directly or 
indirectly, the government can also influence the choice of transportation mode of the passengers through 
propaganda and other means. In the aforementioned game theory model, the government can be thought of as a 
Leader of a Stackelberg oligopoly model. Leader is refers to those in response to the other participants in the game, 
and their actions will affect other participants, and thus to make their own utility maximization. This kind of game 
process is a typical dynamic game model, the leader first action, and then the other participants make decision. In 
the process of game, the government which is based on the considering of public transport enterprises' and 
passengers' choice decide value of GI and P , and make decision to use backward induction method (Harks, 2011; 
Karakostas, 2009; Zhang and Chen, 2011). Backward induction method pushes back a dynamic game from the last 
step, in order to solve the results of the equilibrium of a dynamic game. While in the game, in fact two variables 
EI and e are not decided at the same time, but public transport enterprises and passengers' decision-making 
behaviour can be considered both according to the government's plan to make a decision at the same time. In order 
to study the game how to reach equilibrium state, we take the partial derivative of the bus enterprises expected 
utility function EE to the variable EI  and passengers expected utility function PE  to the variable e  respectively. 
And then we make it to 0, calculation process is as follows. 
Taking partial derivative of EE to EI in the first order:  
             
,01)()()()(  c w
w
PeII
I
E
EEG
E
E JED
 
hence we get              
 
                   .1)()()()(  c PeII EEG JED                                                     (1) 
 
Taking partial derivative of PE  to e  in the first order: 
 
        
,0)()()()(  cc w
w
eCeII
e
E
PEG
P JED
 
hence we get  
 
                    ).()()()( eCeII PEG c cJED                                                     (2) 
 
      From (1) and  (2) we can get the public transport enterprises the equilibrium efforts level as ),( PIII GEE
  ,and 
the equilibrium acceptance level of passengers as ),( PIee G  . Then substitute EI  and e  into expected utility 
function of the government and take partial derivative about variables GI  and penalty factor P  in the first order, 
 
01)()()()(  c w
w  PeII
I
E
EG
G
G
E
JED , 
then we get 
       1)()()()(  c  PeII EG E JED .                                              (3) 
And 
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  01)()()(   w
w  PeII
P
E
EG
G JED , 
then we get  
1)()()(   PeII
EG JED .                                                          (4) 
 
From (3) and (4), we can get the value of the GI  and P , and then substituting them into 
),( PIII GEE
  and ),( PIee G  , the equilibrium values of EI and e  are obtained ( EI and e ). 
Then we will prove that the equilibrium of game process is always existed under the assumptions of the model. 
Taking partial derivative EE  to EI  in the second order, 
 
                         0)()()()(
2
 cc w
w PeII
I
E
EG
E
E
E
JED ,                                         (5) 
 
 while 0)( cc
E
IE , And according to the hypothesis 0)( !GID , 0)( !EIE , 0)( !eJ , we can obtain .0
2
w
w
E
E
I
E
 
 
Similarly, taking partial derivative PE  to e  in the second order,
 
                              )()()()(
2
eCeII
e
E
PG
P
E
cccc w
w JED ,                                             (6) 
while 0)( cc eJ and 0)( !cc eC , so we can get 0
2
w
w
e
EP .  
From the solving process of game equilibrium, we can see if an equilibrium point exists between the public 
transport enterprises and passengers, then the entire game process has an equilibrium solution. From (5) and  (6) we 
can get that the public transport enterprises and passengers expected utility function is concave, according to the 
Tenability of the Nash equilibrium theorem , this sub game equilibrium has an equilibrium shape so the whole 
process of the trilateral game has an equilibrium solution. 
4.2.  The Possibility of Failure Analysis of Pricing Adjustment Program 
From model we can see when the value EI and e  increase at the same time, meanwhile expect utility of three 
participants of the game will increase. But because of the uncertainty risk, public transport enterprises and 
passengers will not increase it, it will lead to pricing adjustment program failed. We will prove it as follow: 
As previously analyzed, the public transport enterprises expect utility function, 
 
 .)()()()( EEEGE IPPeIIE  JED  
 
Calculate EE  total derivative about EI and e , 
 
  .))(()()()1)()()()(( dePeIIdIPeIIdE CEGEEEGE cc JEDJED           (7) 
 
Observe (7), the first item of right side EEEG dIPeII )1)()()()(( c JED is the first order partial derivative of 
the public transport enterprises expect utility function EE to its variable EI ˈIn the equilibrium state, the value is 
0˗The value of the second item of right side dePeII CEG ))(()()( cJED  is positive, because of 0)( !GID ˈ
0)( !EIE ˈ 0)( !c eJ ˈ 0!C ˈ 0!P ; 
Passengers expect utility function 
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)()()()( eCeIIE PEGP  JED , 
 
Calculate PE total derivative about EI and e  
 
                                 .))()()()(()()()( deeCeIIdIeIIdE PEGEPEGP ccc JEDJED                   (8) 
 
Same as the above analyzedˈthe second item of right side of (8) deeCeII PEG ))()()()(( ccJED   is the first 
order partial derivative of the passengers expect utility function PE to its variable eˈIn the equilibrium state, the 
value is 0; the first item of right side is positiveˈbecause of 0)( !GID ˈ 0)( !c EIE ˈ 0)( !eJ ˈ 0! p  
Formula (8) shows that although the improve the level of effort EI  can increase the utility of passengers , but 
because of the existence of opportunistic behaviour ,  the public transport enterprises will not choose to improve EI ; 
Similarly, it can be seen from (7), passengers also does not take the initiative to increase its e , though it will 
increase the public transport enterprises′ utility. 
5. Conclusion 
In previous studies, most of the game models researched on transit pricing are concentrated in relations between 
two participants, rarely involve the analysis of multi-participants. We try to establish a tripartite game model to 
study the government, the public transport enterprises and passengers in the public transit pricing program. And we 
use the backward induction method in studying the game equilibrium conditions. At the same time, this study proves 
that the possibility of failure in the pricing adjustment program, because only one of the game players have a 
negative resistance, it will affect the implementation of the results. According to the model we reveal the 
relationship of players, in order to reduce the risk of failure, the government can be consider to change its 
management and guidance to the public transportation enterprises (that is, the adjustment variables P ) or increase 
the accuracy and efficiency of information transparency and information transfer between the participants. 
The study has several problems to be solved, such as the model variables of investment and utility should be 
determined more accurate. As the dominant side of game, the government’s benefit is very complicated. In public 
transit pricing program, the government should not only consider economic benefit of pricing adjustment program, 
but also consider the social benefits. And the government should coordinate the interests of the enterprises and 
passengers at the same time. If we can precisely define the variables, we can find a solution to the general pattern of 
similar problems. In addition, our model ignores the bargaining process the government and the public transport 
enterprises in the game, and this should be a key step in the process of the pricing adjustment program. Therefore, 
the bargaining process introduced into the trilateral game model will be one of the important works in the next 
phases study. 
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